unpack#2

Malware unpacking · 43 objects · 5 static reports · generated 2026-10-16 18:38:22 UTC

Task outcome

1 unpacked object

AI report excerpt

Stage 1 → Stage 2 (genuine unpacking, not mere extraction):

Read full analysis

Kesakode detections

1 match

Highest recorded code-similarity score per name across analysed objects.

  • Remus43.4%
Unpacked objects

remus_rat_payload.exe

ID 55
File type PE
Category PROGRAM
Architecture X64
Size 199.7 KiB
Kesakode match Remus (43.4%)
SHA256 55be1e896e511af6fc668effae7fb03266f53ae2b05884e07c8b0b170221a233
Unpacking report

Malware Analysis Report — Sample "unpack#2"

File description

  • Sample: unpack#2 — analysis , 2,221,056 bytes, PE32+ (x64), GUI subsystem, SHA256 a64e4bbea5983eefb772b8b467504f6242c913e98a8c7fa9a6fd6e4b9a3631de, entry point 0x140077aa0.
  • Type: Go (x64) binary — Yara "Golang" compiler signature; full Go symbol table present (.symtab, 100,864 bytes), including package main with debug symbols.
  • Masquerade: Version metadata spoofs the legitimate Session messenger desktop app ("Session Foundation", "Private messaging from your desktop", ProductVersion 1.17.10, © 2026). The real Session desktop is not a Go binary — this is a trojanized dropper/loader.
  • Anti-analysis/decoy features: PE TimeDateStamp zeroed; GUI subsystem but no window APIs (anomaly GuiSubsystemNoWindowApi); all main functions renamed to random English words (main.Macromedia, main.Candidate, main.Ourselves, main.Sustainability, main.Confirmed, main.Automobile, main.Resulting) with Go types main.RocketAssembly / main.LaunchConfiguration; ~55 capa "obfuscated stackstrings" matches; 57 dynamic strings; 37 XOR-in-loop anomalies; huge dead/decoy sub-functions filled with rocket/space-themed maps and constants (e.g. main.Candidate.func1/2/3); murmur3 hashing; direct-syscall style API use.

Container handling

  • The root object is a PE executable, not an archive/container — no archive members, no installer, no #UPX.Unpacked virtual file (not UPX-packed).
  • Virtual files are only the spoofed app's benign resources (ICO/1–9, DLG/*, VER/1) and carved files are DIB/PNG icons — none are execution-bearing, so no member analysis was required.
  • The concealed payload was found embedded in .rdata, not in a container (see Packing evidence).

Packing evidence

  • No classic packer (no UPX; sections are plain Go sections; symbols intact). Concealment is custom:
    1. A 204,480-byte encrypted payload blob embedded in .rdata at 0x1400ee104 (.rdata:30104, file offset #ecf04), entropy 115/255, flagged by anomaly BigBufferNoXrefMediumToHighEntropy.
    2. String/section obfuscation: stack strings, dynamic strings, XOR-in-loops, murmur3, decoy junk code.
    3. In-process manual PE loading (no on-disk execution): main.main (0x140081ca0) → main.Candidate (0x140082700, decryptor) → main.Ourselves (0x140082aa0, PE parser: MZ/PE\0\0/machine/section validation) → main.Macromedia (0x140081b40, kernel32!VirtualAlloc via syscall.LazyProc.Call, 0x3000 MEM_COMMIT|RESERVE + 0x40 PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) → header/section copy → main.Sustainability (0x1400820a0, base-relocation applier) → main.Confirmed (0x1400823a0, import resolver: LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress, ordinal resolution by export parsing in main.Resulting) → Syscall(AddressOfEntryPoint + base). capa confirms: "parse PE header", "resolve function by parsing PE exports", "execute syscall".
  • Execution flow of the loader (validates the recovery target): the loader builds a RocketAssembly object at runtime — writes magic 0xA3ABAEA5B0A4A9AF (only the low dword 0xB0A4A9AF survives at offset 0) and copies 204,480 bytes (rep movsq, rcx=0x63D8 qwords) from 0x1400ee104 to obj+4, forming a 0x31EC4-byte blob, then calls main.Candidate(blob, 0x31EC4, 0x31EC4, 0xC4).

Encryption/packing methods and keys found

Stage 1 → Stage 2 (genuine unpacking, not mere extraction):

  • Algorithm: byte-wise ADD of 0xC4 (196) modulo 256 over the whole 0x31EC4-byte blob, followed by full buffer reversal (the two operations commute). Recovered from main.Candidate (0x140082700): for (i=0; i<len; i++) data[i] += 0xC4; then a reverse-append loop; the call site in main.main passes 0xC4 as the 4th argument.
  • Key/marker: ADD key 0xC4; 4-byte magic header 0xB0A4A9AF (from 0xA3ABAEA5B0A4A9AF) prepended to the blob — it decrypts to the trailing ASCII marker thms after the PE.
  • Validation of the method: encrypted blob's last two bytes are 96 89 → +0xC4 reversed → 4D 5A ("MZ"); the encrypted blob's dominant byte is 0x3C (18% of bytes) = the PE's zero-byte mass shifted by −0xC4 (0x3C+0xC4 = 0x00).
  • Recovered payload: analysis , 204,480-byte PE32+ x64, SHA256 dbf91d770417be1f6d3a857234d516745eef1dd332366960ebb562ba4958f51f. Valid MZ header (e_lfanew 0x78, DOS stub "This program cannot be run in DOS mode"), and its file size exactly matches its own section layout (header 1024 + .text 169,472 + .rdata 9,216 + .data 19,456 + .reloc 5,120 + 192-byte overlay = 204,480) — an exact, complete image.
  • Transform applied: Malcat transform_interval on 0x1400ee104 (204,480 bytes) with chain [add 0xC4 (byte, lsb)] → [reverse].

Stage 2 identification and its own protection (checked for further stages):

  • Family: Remus RAT (kesakode verdict 43/100). unpack_custom families (Donut, Hijackloader) do not match, so no custom unpacker was applicable; extract_malware_config (Remus) succeeded — genuine config decryption:
    • AES key a0a3e4b30725efa6ce8312722cb6dde05e89068a9cca756eedd9b92e6c877f91 (at 0x14002bc70), nonce 6f9eb3964bdb35f7 (0x14002bc90), ciphertext at 0x14002bca0.
    • C2: http://80.97.160.155:80, http://baxe.pics:48261; botid c6f3d5679180342406405be66c6e4dd2.
    • Strings/behaviors: "REMUS LOG", "PROXY" markers, imports KERNEL32/USER32/GDI32/ADVAPI32/OLEAUT32/ole32, CreateCompatibleBitmap, clipboard collection (capa: open/read clipboard data), Base64, RC4 PRGA, Mersenne Twister, murmur3, stack strings, dynamic API resolution.
  • The Remus PE is not further packed (MSVC 2015 linker, normal sections, no UPX, no virtual files, no carved files). Its 192-byte overlay (#31e00) is a hex-encoded English wordlist (string-obfuscation dictionary, e.g. "deformitysleepifysohodiligent…wonderfulalgori") — data, not a stage. Its config blob is obfuscated and was decrypted by the extractor. No further embedded executable stage was found inside it.
  • Other flagged blobs in the dropper — investigated, not payloads:
    • 0x1401bd8e0 (.data, 10,016 bytes, entropy 154/255): Go internal/strconv dboxFtoa64 lookup table (referenced by lea r8,[0x1401BD8E0] in internal.strconv.dboxFtoa64) — benign runtime data.
    • 0x140139f30 (.rdata:7bf30, 239,024 bytes, entropy 115/255): a Go string field (slice header at 0x1401bc3b0, <GO.LayoutTable>+50, len=cap=0x3A5B0) — structured binary data with no ASCII strings and no archive/PE magic; a strict scan for single-byte XOR/ADD-transformed PE images (forward and reversed, validated via full DOS header + e_lfanew + PE\0\0 signature cross-check) found zero candidates; no function in the loader's execution chain references it (all main.* functions are accounted for in the load chain). Assessed as an embedded resource/decoy, not a recoverable stage (unresolved minor item, no supporting evidence of being a concealed payload).

Extraction vs. genuine unpacking: nothing was merely "extracted" from a container. The Stage-2 PE was genuinely unpacked/decrypted by reversing a custom cipher (ADD-0xC4 + reverse, key 0xC4), and the result is independently validated by (a) exact PE structural conformance, (b) section-layout size match, and (c) successful independent decryption of the Remus stage's own AES-obfuscated config from the recovered image. The Remus config recovery is likewise genuine decryption (key/nonce/ciphertext), not extraction.