unpack#6

Malware unpacking · 2 objects · 2 static reports · generated 2026-10-16 17:07:18 UTC

Task outcome

0 unpacked objects

An analysis summary is not available.

Read full analysis
  • No unpacked samples were returned.

Kesakode detections

No Kesakode detections recorded.

Unpacked objects

No unpacked object was returned.

Unpacking report

Report

File description

  • Sample: 33df5d6b61564f89fb40a5c32fc059b1d15fd7971bf3c6db9671100c3ff673f8.FileScanIO (), PE32+ (X64), 8,924,536 bytes, SHA256 33df5d6b...f673f8.
  • YARA/CAPA identify it as a Go binary (compiled with Go, Golang compiler signature). The main package is heavily obfuscated (garble-style random identifiers, e.g. main.O0Au9zvl, main.xlusz, main.vZ5deNtW4v4, main.k4PLMxKeF, main.i83YhcODPaxO9l at 0x62f500, 0x51f7c0, 0x572b20, 0x57fce0, 0x5172e0); the binary retains a COFF symbol table (.symtab) and DEBUG symbols, which is how the main.* functions were enumerated.
  • CAPA behavioural markers: startup-folder persistence (Microsoft\Windows\...\Programs\Startup at 0x687b01, .lnk creation via CoCreateInstance/ole32), APPDATA/LOCALAPPDATA usage, socket connect/receive (C2), file delete, process termination, PE-header parsing, dynamic export resolution, an unimported downloader-related API string, obfuscated stack strings, and main.O0Au9zvl calls os.ReadFile/os.WriteFile/os.MkdirAll/filepath.Join/syscall.UTF16PtrFromString — consistent with a Go dropper/loader.
  • Authenticode-signed with a self-signed certificate "Aurora Craft" (serial 0e62e4289ed4281bb085d369e55a0cc2, validity 2026-09-13 → 2027-09-20).

Container handling

  • The root file is a PE, not an archive; no archive members to extract.
  • One carved file was found and analysed: a PKCS7/CMS Authenticode signature at file offset #880e08, size 8046 (overlay at #880e00, 8056 bytes), analysed as . This is the code-signing certificate blob only — it contains no embedded payload and is not a concealed stage. No #UPX.Unpacked or other virtual files exist (file_list_virtual_files returned empty).
  • unpack_custom was tried for the supported loader families: Hijackloader → failed ("No CRC-valid IDAT chunk with HijackLoader magic was found"); Donut → returned no payload. KESAKODE verdicts (Cyclops, FrostyGoop, HackBrowserData, NeedleStealer) all 0/100.

Packing evidence

  • No UPX or classic packer signatures; sections are plainly named (.text/.rdata/.data/.pdata/.xdata/.idata/.reloc/.symtab) with normal entropy except .rdata.
  • Strong anomaly evidence of a concealed payload inside the PE itself:
    • A ~5.2 MB high-entropy region in .rdata, approximately VA 0x6caeb0 – 0xbec998 (entropy ≈ 188/255, i.e. ~7.4 bits/byte), flagged by 147 BigBufferNoXrefMediumToHighEntropy anomaly hits. This is far beyond normal Go runtime data and is the prime concealed-payload candidate.
    • A large 16-byte-record table in .rdata at approximately 0x691110 – 0x6b3d00 (~8,900 records of the form {u32 a, u32 b, u32 c, u32 0}), interpreted as a possible index of embedded encrypted strings/resources (offset/length/key-like fields).
    • Obfuscation artefacts: a custom 63-character alphabet string 0123456789@ABC…Zabc…z near 0x689c8c, a small DSL string set ("add SEAT / find STAR / snapshot base / diff base modified / report second"), a 16-byte literal SERSPATEALRTLNEI at 0x67fab0, capa "obfuscated stackstrings" (9 matches), and several same-shaped main.* functions referencing ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ, 0123456789, +, |, #, - (custom base-N/encoding helpers).
  • Other anomalies (CrossSectionJump, XorInLoop ×130, SpaghettiFunction, StackArrayInitialisation, ManyUniqueImmediateBytes, PossibleDownloaderApiDynamicImport) support obfuscation but are not conclusive packing.

Encryption/packing methods and keys found

  • No concrete decryption routine, key, IV, or transform chain was recovered. CAPA matches for "RC4 PRGA" (0x414120 in runtime.mapassign_fast64ptr, 0x42a1c0 in runtime.addspecial) and "AES via x86 extensions" (0x464100/0x464140 in runtime.memhash32) are false positives inside Go runtime code, not loader crypto; no crypto/rc4, crypto/aes, encoding/hex, or encoding/base64 symbols are present.
  • The ~5.2 MB .rdata blob is presumed encrypted/encoded (high entropy, no recognizable magic such as MZ/gzip/zlib/PK at its start), but the algorithm and keys remain unidentified.
  • Unresolved blockers: (1) no code or data cross-references to the high-entropy blob could be resolved (Go rip-relative LEA xrefs to the blob are absent from Malcat's reference graph, and no slice/string header pointing into the blob was located in the file-backed .data range VA 0xc38000–0xc4a000); (2) Ghidra-style decompilation of the Go main.* functions is unusable (Go register ABI produces empty/garbage pseudocode), and the candidate decryptor functions are 12–110 KB each; (3) the 16-byte-record table's semantics (offset/length/key vs. Go runtime structure) could not be confirmed. Consequently, no genuine unpacking/decryption of the concealed stage was achieved — the only "extraction" performed was carving the Authenticode PKCS7 signature, which is ordinary extraction of signing metadata, not genuine unpacking of a payload.
  • No further packed/encrypted stages were recovered, so no stage-2+ analysis was possible. No keys, URLs, or C2 indicators were recovered (only DigiCert CA/OCSP URLs inside the certificate).